The fair exchange problem is key to trading electronic items in systems of mutually untrusted parties. In modern variants of such systems, each party is equipped with a tamper proof security module. The security modules trust each other but can only communicate by exchanging messages through their host parties. These hosts are untrusted and could intercept and drop those messages. We describe a synchronous algorithm that ensures deterministic fair exchange if a majority of parties are honest, which is optimal in terms of resilience. If there is no honest majority, our algorithm degrades gracefully: it ensures that the probability of violating fairness can be made arbitrarily low. We prove that this probability is inversely proportional to the average complexity of the algorithm in terms of its number of communication rounds, and we supply the corresponding optimal probability distribution. Our algorithm uses, as an underlying building block, an early stopping subprotocol that solves, in a model with general omission failures, a specific variant of consensus we call biased consensus. Our modular approach contributes in bridging the gap between modern security (i.e., based on security modules) and traditional distributed computing (i.e., agreement with omission failures).
Introduction

Motivation
Fair exchange is a fundamental problem in systems with electronic business transactions. In fair exchange, the participating parties start with an item they want to trade for another item. They possess an executable description of the desired item, typically a boolean function with which an arbitrary item can be checked for the desired properties. Furthermore, they know from which party to expect the desired item and which party is expecting their own item. An algorithm that solves fair exchange must ensure that every honest party eventually either delivers its desired item or aborts the exchange (termination property). The abort option however is excluded if no party misbehaves and all items match their descriptions (effectiveness). The algorithm should also guarantee that, if the desired item of any party does not match its description, then no party can obtain any (useful) information about any other item (fairness property).
Fair exchange is easily solvable using a trusted third party through which all items can be exchanged [6] . The involvement of the trusted third party can be reduced using optimistic schemes where participation of the trusted third party is only necessary if something goes wrong [1] . The context of this paper is one where the trusted third party is a virtual entity, distributed within all untrusted parties, as we explain below.
We consider in this paper a system where each party hosts a security module that is tamper proof ( Fig. 1) . Recently, manufacturers have begun to equip hardware with such modules: these include for instance smart cards or special microprocessors. Examples include the "Embedded Security Subsystem" within the recent IBM Thinkpad or the IBM 4758 secure co-processor board [7] . In fact, a large body of computer and device manufacturers has founded the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [21] to promote this idea. Because their hardware is tamper proof, the software running within the security modules is certified and they can communicate through secure channels. In certain settings, the overall system can even assumed to be synchronous, i.e., it is reasonable to assume an upper bound on the relative speeds of honest parties (and their security modules) as well as on the communication delays between them. However, dishonest parties can still drop messages exchanged between the underlying security modules in order to violate the fairness of the exchange in their favor, i.e., obtain an item without giving away their own. The contribution of this paper is a synchronous distributed algorithm aimed at exchanging electronic items among untrusted parties, each hosting a security module. The algorithm provides the two following complementary features:
1. If a majority of parties is honest, then the algorithm deterministically guarantees the termination, effectiveness and fairness properties of fair exchange. This is optimal in terms of resilience: we indeed show that, even in a synchronous model with security modules, no deterministic algorithm solves fair exchange if half of the parties are dishonest. 2. If at least half of the parties turn out to be dishonest, then our algorithm degrades gracefully in the following sense. It still guarantees the termination and effectiveness properties of fair exchange, as well as ensures that the probability of violating fairness can be made arbitrarily low. We supply the probability distribution that optimizes the average complexity of the algorithm, in terms of its number of communication rounds, and we show that probability of violating fairness is inversely proportional to the average algorithm complexity.
the security modules to their untrusted hosts: this is only performed if the third phase (below) terminates successfully. Any security module can decide here to abort the exchange if some item is missing or does not match its expected description. The security module hosted by the party that initiates the exchange also selects here a random number k that it disseminates to all other security modules. The role of this random number is crucial in the second phase of the algorithm. 2. In the second phase, which we call the fake phase, all security modules exchange messages during k rounds; each round following the same communication pattern as in the third phase (below). The fact that the random number k, determined in the first phase, is not accessible to the untrusted parties is fundamental here. Roughly speaking, the goal of the fake phase is to make the probability, for any number of dishonest parties to successfully guess when the actual agreement phase is taking place (third phase below), arbitrarily low. If any dishonest party drops a message towards a honest party in this fake phase, the security module hosted by the latter simply aborts the exchange and forces other modules to abort the exchange as well, thus penalizing any dishonest host that might try to bias the exchange in its favor. 3. In the third phase, which we call the agreement phase, the security modules solve a problem we call biased consensus. In this problem, the processes (in our case the security modules) start from an initial binary value (a proposal) and need to decide on a final binary value: either to abort the exchange or commit it (and deliver the items to their untrusted hosts). Unlike in consensus [9] , but like in NBAC (non-blocking atomic commit) [5, 20] , the problem is biased towards 1: no process can decide 1 if some process proposes 0 (to avoid trivial solutions, the processes are supposed to decide 1 if no process fails or proposes 0). The agreement aspect of this problem is however different from consensus and NBAC; it is also biased towards 1: we simply require here that, if some process decides 1, then no correct process decides 0. We consider an early stopping algorithm that solves this problem in a model with general omissions, along the lines of [17] .
Besides our main contribution, i.e., a new gracefully degrading fair exchange algorithm, our paper contributes in bridging the gap between security problems (fair exchange) and traditional distributed computing problems (consensus-like problems). We show indeed that deterministic fair exchange in a model with security modules is equivalent to biased consensus. By proving that biased consensus is impossible in a synchronous model [13] with general omission failures [18] if half of the processes can be faulty we directly establish a lower bound result for fair exchange in a model with tamper proof modules.
Roadmap
Section 2 defines our system model. Section 3 recalls the fair exchange problem, introduces biased consensus, and shows their equivalence in a model with security modules. We also state the impossibility of deterministic fair exchange without a honest majority which motivates our notion of gracefully degrading fair exchange. Section 4 describes our gracefully exchange fair exchange algorithm and states its correctness. Section 5 concludes the paper by discussing some related work. Most of the proofs are given in the optional appendices.
Model
The system we consider is composed of a set of processes, some modeling untrusted hosts and the other modeling security modules. These processes communicate by exchanging messages.
Untrusted hosts and security modules
More precisely, the set of processes we consider is divided into two disjoint classes: untrusted hosts (or simply hosts) and security modules. Two processes connected by a physical channel are said to be adjacent. We assume that there exists a fully connected communication topology between the hosts, i.e., any two hosts are adjacent. Furthermore, we assume that every host process P A is adjacent to exactly one security module process G A (i.e., there is a bijective mapping between security modules and hosts): we say that P A is associated with G A . No two security modules are adjacent. In other words, for any two security modules G A and G B to communicate, they need to do so through their hosts P A and P B . This indirection provides the abstraction of an overlay network at the level of security modules. We call the part of the system consisting of security modules, and the virtual communication links between them, the security subsystem. We call the part of the system consisting of hosts and the communication links between them the untrusted system. The notion of association can be extended to systems, meaning that, for any given untrusted system, the associated security subsystem is the system consisting of all security modules associated to any host in that untrusted system.
Security modules and virtual channels
Security modules are interconnected by a virtual communication network with bidirectional channels over the physical communication network among the hosts. For simplicity, we denote the participants processes (the security modules) by G 1 , . . . , G n . We assume that between any two security modules G i and G j , the following properties are guaranteed: (1) Message contents remain secret from unauthorized entities; (2) If a message is delivered at G j , then it was previously sent by G i ; (3) Message contents are not tampered with during transmission, i.e., any change during transmission will be detected and the message will be discarded; (4)If a message is sent by G i to G j and G j is ready to receive the message, then the message will be delivered at G j within some known bound ∆ on the waiting time.
Trust and adversary model
Security modules can be trusted by other security modules or hosts, and hosts cannot be trusted by anybody. Hosts may be malicious, i.e., they may actively try to fool a protocol by not sending any message, sending wrong messages, or even sending the right messages at the wrong time. We assume however that hosts are computationally bounded, i.e., brute force attacks on secure channels are not possible. Security modules are supposed to be cheap devices without their own source of power. They rely on power supply from their hosts. A host may inhibit all communication between its associated security module and the outside world, yielding a channel in which messages can be lost.
A host misbehaves if it does not correctly follow the prescribed algorithm and we say that the host is dishonest. Otherwise it is said to be honest. Misbehavior is unrestricted (but computationally bounded as we pointed out). Security modules always follow their protocol, but since their associated hosts can inhibit all communication, this results in a system model of security modules with unreliable channels (the model of general omission [18] , i.e., where messages may not be sent or received). In such systems, misbehavior (i.e., failing to send or receive a message) is sometimes termed failure. We call security modules associated with honest hosts correct, whereas those associated with dishonest hosts faulty. In a set of n hosts, we use t to denote a bound on the number of hosts which are allowed to misbehave and f the number of hosts which actually do misbehave (f ≤ t). Sometimes we restrict our attention to the case where t < n/2, i.e., where a majority of hosts is assumed to be honest. We call this the honest/correct majority assumption.
Our model of the adversary is based on the strongest possible attack, the case in which all of the f dishonest hosts collude. We assume that adversary knows all the algorithms and probability distributions used.
Variations on Fair Exchange
In this section we recall the definition of fair exchange (FE), and we show that this problem, at the level of untrusted hosts, is in a precise sense equivalent to a problem that we call biased consensus (BC), at the level of the underlying security modules. Then, we state that biased consensus is impossible if half of the processes can be faulty and derive the impossibility of fair exchange if a majority of hosts can be dishonest (the detailed proof can be found in Appendix A). This motivates our definition of a weaker variant of fair exchange, the gracefully degrading FE.
Fair exchange
Definition 1 (Fair Exchange). An algorithm solves fair exchange (FE) if it satisfies the following properties [1, 16] -(Timeliness) Every honest host eventually terminates.
-(Effectiveness) If no host misbehaves and if all items match their descriptions then, upon termination, every host has the expected item. -(Fairness) If the desired item of any host does not match its description, or any honest host does not obtain any (useful) information about the expected item, then no host can obtain any (useful) information about any other host's item.
In case a host terminates without receiving the expected item, that host receives an abort indication (denoted ⊥). The Timeliness property ensures that every honest host can be sure that at some point in time the algorithm will terminate. The Effectiveness property states what should happen if all goes well. Finally, the Fairness property postulates restrictions on the information flow for the case where something goes wrong in the protocol. 1 Note that the first precondition of the Fairness property ("if the desired item of any host does not match the description. . . ") is very important. Without this condition, a "successful" outcome of the exchange would be possible even if an item does not match the expected description, which should clearly be considered unfair.
Biased Consensus
Consider the following variant of consensus, we call biased consensus in a model where processes can fail by general omissions [18] . Processes invoke biased consensus using primitive BCpropose(vote), vote being a binary value, 0 or 1. Possible decisions are also 0 (abort) and 1 (commit). Termination, Non-Triviality and Validity are the same as in NBAC, whereas the Biased Validity is weaker than the Agreement property of NBAC [20] We show below that FE and BC are equivalent in our model. To prove this claim, we first show that FE can be reduced to BC. Theorem 1. Biased consensus is solvable in the security subsystem, iff fair exchange is solvable in the associated untrusted system.
Proof.
(1) Assume that we have a solution to BC in the security subsystem consisting of security modules G 1 , . . . , G n . Now consider the algorithm depicted in Fig. 2 . This is a wrapper around the BC solution that solves FE at the level of the hosts. In other words, it is a reduction of FE into BC in our model. In the algorithm, a host hands to the associated security module its item and the executable description of the desired item, as well as identifiers of the hosts with which items should be exchanged. The security module exchanges the item with its partners, then checks the received item (initialization phase). Finally all security modules agree on the outcome using BC (agreement phase). The proposal value for BC is 1 if the check was successful and no abort was requested by the host in the meantime. If BC terminates with the process deciding 1, then the security module releases the item to the host. We now discuss each of the properties of fair exchange. The Timeliness property of FE is guaranteed by the Termination property of BC and the synchronous model assumption. Consider Effectiveness and assume that all participating hosts are honest and all items match their descriptions. All votes for BC will be 1. Now the Non-Triviality property of BC guarantees that all processes (recall that every process is correct) will decide 1 and subsequently return the item to their hosts. Consider now Fairness and observe that, in our adversary model, no dishonest host can derive any useful information from merely observing messages exchanged over the secure channels. The only way to receive information is through the interface of the FairExchange procedure. If one item does not match the description at some process, then this process will engage in BC with a vote = 0 (note that this will happen even if the associated host is dishonest). Validity of BC implies that the exchange results in no process deciding 1, so none of the hosts receives anything from the exchange. Additionally, if some honest host receives nothing through the exchange, then the Biased Agreement property of BC implies that no host can receive anything.
(2) Conversely, BC can be implemented using FE by invoking
at every process G i . 2 Here we assume that if FE returns abort instead of the item, BC returns 0. So the votes, being exchange items in this case, are exchanged in a circular fashion among security modules. It is not difficult to see that FE properties guarantee the properties of BC. This is immediate for Termination and Non-Triviality. Consider now Validity and assume that G j proposes 0 to BC. The item description checking at G j+1 will fail and the first part of FE Fairness ("If the desired item of any host does not match its description. . . ") guarantees that every process that decides in BC decides 0. The second part of Fairness guarantees Biased Validity. 3 Theorem 2. Consider a synchronous system where processes can fail by general omissions. No algorithm solves biased consensus if n 2 processes can be faulty.
We give in optional Appendix A a detailed proof of this theorem, based on a partitioning of the processes. Note that this partitioning technique is different from the one traditionally used to prove consensus impossibility results (such as in [19] ). In short, this is because, in consensus, if the processes of one partition all propose 0 and the processes of the other all propose 1, we clearly end up with two different decisions and a contradiction. This does not apply to biased consensus and the proof is slightly more involved. 4 A direct corollary of the Theorems 1 and 2 leads to derive the following result:
Theorem 3. Consider our model of untrusted hosts and security modules. No algorithm solves fair exchange if half of the hosts can be dishonest.
Gracefully Degrading Fair Exchange
The impossibility of solving fair exchange (deterministically) if half of the processes can be dishonest, motivates the introduction of the following variant of the problem.
Definition 3 (Gracefully Degrading Fair Exchange
). An algorithm solves gracefully degrading fair exchange (GDFE) if it satisfies the following properties:
-The algorithm always satisfies the Timeliness and Effectiveness properties of fair exchange.
-If a majority of hosts are honest, then the algorithm also satisfies the Fairness property of fair exchange. -Otherwise (if there is no honest majority), the algorithm satisfies Fairness with a probability p (0 < p < 1) such that the probability of unfairness (1 − p) can be made arbitrarily low.
A Gracefully Degrading Fair Exchange Algorithm
Overview
Our GDFE algorithm is described in Figure 3 . We assume that all processes involved in the algorithm know each other. The process with the lowest number is the initiator. We also assume synchronous communication model [13] in the security subsystem. Basically, our algorithm can be viewed as an extension of the algorithm of Figure 2 , i.e., our reduction of deterministic fair exchange to biased consensus. However, whereas the algorithm of Figure 2 is made of an initialization phase followed by an agreement (BC) phase, the algorithm of Figure 3 introduces a fake phase between these two phases. This is the key to graceful degradation, i.e., to minimizing the probability of unfairness in the case when t ≥ n/2. Basically, we do not run the BC algorithm immediately after the exchange of items (i.e., unlike in Fig. 2 ), but at some randomly picked round. In the meantime the processes exchange f ake messages and, if necessary, react to the behavior of hosts. If any process detects host misbehavior, i.e., a message omission, it aborts the algorithm immediately (line 15) and does not participate in BC. 5 It is important to notice that the underlying BC algorithm guarantees that no process decides 1 if some process does not participate in the algorithm (this missing process might have proposed 0). This is the way of penalizing any host that misbehaves in the first two phases of the algorithm. The BC algorithm we use here is an adaptation of the early-stopping synchronous consensus algorithm of [17] . This algorithm solves BC if there is a majority of correct processes (t < n/2). It is early stopping in the sense that every process terminates in at most min(f + 2, t + 1) rounds. This feature is important in minimizing the probability for the adversary to violate fairness (as we discuss in the next subsection): in short, the BC algorithm we consider has two vulnerable rounds: if the adversary misses them, the exchange terminates successfully. There are mainly two differences with the consensus algorithm of [17] : (1) the processes agree on a vector of initially proposed values rather then on a set of those (in the case of consensus); (2) we also introduce dummy messages to have a full information protocol [13] , in order to have a uniform communication pattern in every round, as we explain below. (Our BC algorithm is given in Fig. 4 of Appendix B).
To make sure that the adversary has no means to distinguish the fake phase from the agreement phase (i.e., the BC algorithm), we make use of the same communication pattern in both phases, i.e., the same distribution and sizes of the exchanged messages: Every process sends a fixed-size message to every other process in every round, both in the fake phase and in the BC algorithm. Messages in f ake phase are, therefore, padded before sending, to the size of BC message. Hence, the adversary is not able to determine when BC starts, neither by observing when security modules send and receive messages, nor by observing the size of these messages.
GDFairExchange(myitem, description, source, destination) returns item is 01: if Gi is initiator then % initialization phase -round 0 02: pick a random number k according to a given distribution 03:
foreach Gj = destination do send (⊥, k) to Gj enddo 04:
send (myitem, k) to destination 05: else 06:
send (myitem, ⊥) to destination 07: endif 08: if ((item, * ) has been received from source) and (check description on item succeeds) and (( * , k) has been received from initiator ) then 09:
votei := 1; ki := k; itemi := item 10: else 11:
return (⊥) 12: endif 13: for round := 1, 2, . . . , ki do % f ake phase -k rounds 14:
send padded votei to all 15:
if not((vote) has been received from all processes) then return (⊥) endif 16: enddo 
Correctness
Theorem 4. The algorithm of Figure 3 solves gracefully degrading fair exchange.
The detailed proof of Theorem 4 and other theorems of this section can be found in optional Appendix C. Here, we emphasize the case when the adversary controls half or more of the hosts. In addition, we define and give the optimal probability distribution of the random number k in this case.
If there is no honest majority, Fairness could be violated. However, this could occur only if the adversary successfully guesses in which round BC starts. Indeed, because our BC algorithm is early stopping, in order to succeed, the adversary must cut one of the first two rounds of BC and this has to be its first misbehavior in a particular algorithm run.
The number k of rounds in the second phase of the algorithm is chosen randomly by the initiator of the exchange according to a given distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) i.e., Pr(k = i) = β i . We assume this distribution to be public. The adversary performs the attack in a given round by dropping a certain subset of messages sent to, or received by, the hosts it controls, i.e., by cutting the channels. When the adversary cuts channels at more than n/2 hosts in the same round, we say that it cuts the round. Since the adversary does not know in which round BC starts, the best attack consists in choosing a value i according to the distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ), starting from which adversary cuts all the rounds until the end of the exchange. Cutting messages at less that n/2 hosts, or cutting non-consecutive rounds, cannot improve the probability of success of the adversary.
We define the probability of unfairness Γ (β 0 ,β 1 ,... ) as the maximum probability that an adversary succeeds, given the distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ), and the average complexity in terms of number of f ake rounds as Λ (β 0 ,β 1 ,... ) = i≥1 iβ i . Theorem 5. Let (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) denote the probability distribution of the value k. The probability of unfairness (for the algorithm of Figure 3) is
Furthermore, we define the probability distribution that we call bi-uniform, as well as the optimal probability distribution for the algorithm of Figure 3 . and β 1 = t.
Definition 5. We say that a probability distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) is optimal (for the algorithm of Figure 3 ) if there is no other probability distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) such that ∃Γ > 0, ∀i ≥ 0,
In other words, a probability distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) is optimal if there is no: (1) probability distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) and (2) probability of unfairness Γ such that the average complexity of (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ), in terms of the number fake rounds, is lower that the average complexity of (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ).
The following theorem states our optimality result and proves that the probability of unfairness can be made arbitrarily low, by making the algorithm complexity higher. Theorem 6. The optimal probability distribution (for the algorithm of Figure 3) is the bi-uniform probability distribution of parameter 0. Moreover, if the distribution is defined on [0, κ] with κ even, the probability of unfairness is Γ bi-uniform = 2 κ+2 and the average complexity, in terms of the number of fake rounds, is Λ bi-uniform = κ 2 . 6
Concluding Remarks
It was shown in [8] that deterministic two-party fair exchange is impossible without a trusted third party. We are not aware of any impossibility result for fair exchange between more than two parties.
Published results on such multi-party protocols focus on reducing the necessary trust in the third party [3, 10] , or focus on contract signing [4, 11] , a special form of fair exchange. In [12] it was shown that, in a synchronous system with cryptography, a majority of honest processes can simulate a centralized trusted third party (and hence solve fair exchange). The use of security modules in fair exchange was already explored in the two-party context: in particular, [23] employs smart cards as security modules to solve two-party fair exchange in an optimistic way, whereas [2] describes a probabilistic solution to two-party fair exchange.
A Impossibility of Biased Consensus without Correct Majority
We consider the synchronous model of [13] , with general omission failure model [18] . Processes proceed in synchronous rounds and may fail by omitting to send or to receive a message, or both. Note that the properties of Biased Consensus (BC) imply that: (a) if some process propose 0, then no process decides 1, and (b) (non-uniform agreement) no two correct processes decide differently. Also by definition, NBAC (non blocking atomic commit) is stronger than BC.
Theorem 2. No algorithm solves biased consensus if n 2 processes can be faulty.
Proof. We divide the set of processes into two sets, S 1 and S 2 , each containing at most n 2 processes. In a given run of BC algorithm, the k-round configuration C denotes the configuration of the system at the end of round k in that run. We define some runs which extend a k-round configuration as follows: run1(C) is a run in which, after round k, the processes in S 2 fail in such a way that, in every round after round k and for each i ∈ {1, 2}: (1) processes in S i receive messages from other processes in S i , and (3) no process in S i receives any message from any process in S 3−i . Basically, the processes in S 2 fail by send omission while sending message to processes in S 1 , and fail by receive omission when receiving message from processes in S 1 . We define run2(C) symmetrically: a run in which, after round k, the processes in S 1 fail in such a way that, in every round after round k and each i ∈ {1, 2}: (1) the processes in S i receive messages from other processes in S i , and (3) no process in S i receives any message from any process in S 3−i .
Here processes in S 1 fail by send omission while sending message to processes in S 2 , and fail by receive omission when receiving messages from processes in S 2 . It is important to observe that no process can distinguish run1(C) from run2(C).
We denote by val1(C) the decision value of processes in S 1 in run1(C). Since all processes in S 1 are correct, they all decide on the same value in run1(C). Since no process in S 1 can distinguish run1(C) from run2(C), the processes in S 1 decide val1(C) in run2(C) as well. Similarly, val2(C) denotes the decision value of processes in S 2 in run2(C), and hence, in run1(C) as well.
Suppose by contradiction that there is an algorithm A that solves BC when n 2 processes can fail. Consider a run r of A in which every process proposes 1 and no process is faulty. By the Non Triviality property of BC, every process decides 1 in r, say at round z. Denote by C k the configuration of the system at the end of round k in r. We now try to determine val1(C k ) and val2(C k ).
We claim that val1(C 0 ) is 0. To see why, notice that the processes in S 1 are correct in run1(C 0 ) and they never receive any message from the processes in S 2 . Thus, processes in S 1 cannot distinguish run1(C 0 ) from run1(D), where D is an initial configuration in which processes in S 1 propose 1 and processes in S 2 propose 0. From Validity, processes in S 1 decide 0 in run1(D), and hence, in run1(C 0 ). Thus val1(C 0 ) is 0. Similarly, we can show that val2(C 0 ) is 0.
Clearly, val1(C z ) is 1, because all processes decide (or rather, has already decided) 1 in run1(C z ). Similarly, val2(C z ) is 1.
We now claim that for all rounds i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ z, val1(C i ) = val2(C i ). Assume that val1(C i ) = 0 and val2(C i ) = 1. (The contradiction for val1(C i ) = 1 and val2(C i ) = 0, is symmetric.) Consider run1(C i ). The processes in S 1 are correct in run1(C i ) and they decide val1(C i ) = 0. The processes in S 2 are faulty in run1(C i ), but they cannot distinguish run1(C i ) from run2(C i ) and hence, decide val2(C i ) = 1 in run1(C i ). Thus run1(C i ) violates Biased Agreement.
Thus, for every round i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ z, val1(C i ) = val2(C i ). Thus there is a round j such that val1(C j ) = val2(C j ) = 0 and val1(C j+1 ) = val2(C j+1 ) = 1. Consider the following j + 1 round configuration C that is obtained by extending C j as follows: processes in S 2 fail (actually commit send omission) such that: (1) for i ∈ {1, 2}, the processes in S i receive messages from other processes in S i , (2) no process in S 1 receives any message from S 2 in round j + 1, but (3) the processes in S 2 receive the message from every process in S 1 .
Observe that S 2 cannot distinguish C from C j+1 and S 1 cannot distinguish C from the (j + 1)round configuration of run1(C j ). Consider a run r that extends C in which S 2 omits to send and receive a message from S 1 . Notice that S 1 is correct in r and S 2 is faulty in r . However, S 2 cannot distinguish r from run2(C j+1 ), and hence, decides val2(C j+1 ) = 1 at the end of round z in r . Furthermore, S 1 cannot distinguish r from run1(C j ), and hence, decides val1(C j ) = 0 at the end of round z in r . Clearly, r violates Biased Agreement.
B Early Stopping Biased Consensus Algorithm
As we pointed out in the Section 4, our biased consensus algorithm of Figure 4 is an adaptation of the synchronous early stopping uniform consensus algorithm of [17] . Our modifications with respect to the algorithm of [17] is that we have processes agree on a vector of initially proposed values (V ote), rather then on the set of those. This is a minor change that does not affect the properties of the algorithm. Basically, every process i stores information about the value initially proposed by some process j at V ote i [j].
In addition, we introduce dummy messages to solve the security requirement of our gracefully degrading fair exchange algorithm and to have the uniform communication pattern. In other words, in our biased consensus solution, every process in every round sends exactly one message to every other process, but some (dummy) messages are tagged to be disregarded by the receiving process. Our solution assumes that every BC protocol message has the same size. 7 We now give and prove the properties of our BC algorithm. We do not prove here that all processes that invoke decide() function (lines 30-34) agree on the vector V ote (this includes all correct processes if t < n/2). Reader interested in this proof should refer to [17] . As discussed above, our algorithm inherently satisfies this property, given t < n/2. To summarize, our algorithm satisfies the following properties:
-(Early Stopping) Every correct process decides in at most min(f + 2, t + 1) rounds.
-(Non Triviality) If no process is faulty or proposes 0, then no correct process decides 0. -(Validity) No process decides 1 if some process proposes 0.
-(Biased Agreement) If any process decides 1, then no correct process decides 0.
Early Stopping property is inherited from the original algorithm. Consider Non Triviality. Assume that all processes are correct and all propose 1. In this case, all processes agree on vector V ote = 1 n . Therefore decide() returns 1 at every process. Consider now Biased Agreement and note that, if any process decides 1 it must have invoked decide() and V ote = 1 n . This implies that every correct process invokes decide(), evaluates the same vector V ote that processes agreed on and, therefore, returns 1. Consider now Validity If some process p j proposed vote j = 0 every process p i that invokes decide() (if any) has V ote i [j] = 0 or V ote i [j] = ⊥ , as processes agree on prove Theorems 5 and 6 and show that even if there is no honest majority, probability of probability of unfairness can be made arbitrarily low and that it is inversely proportional to the average complexity in terms of fake rounds. This completes the proof of Theorem 4. In addition, Theorem 6 gives the optimal probability distribution of the value k.
Theorem 5. Let (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) denote the probability distribution of the value k. The probability of unfairness (for the algorithm of Figure 3) is
Proof. Let γ i be the probability that the attack succeeds if it starts at round i (i > 0). We already know that γ i≤k = 0 and that γ i>k+2 = 0. We have therefore:
According to the probability distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ), the maximum probability of unfairness Γ (β 0 ,β 1 ,... ) is therefore
Example 1. If (β 0 , β 1 , . . . , β κ ) is the uniform distribution on the interval [0, κ], then β i = 1 κ+1 if 0 ≤ i ≤ κ and β i = 0 otherwise. We have therefore Γ uniform = max 0≤i≤κ−1 (β i + β i+1 ) = 2 κ+1 and the average complexity in terms of fake rounds is in this case Λ uniform = κ 2 . Note that Definition 4 of Section 4 implies that, for bi-uniform distribution β i = 1 κ+1 2 − t if i is even and β i = t if i is odd. Moreover, t is necessarily equal to 0 if κ is even and 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 κ+1 2 if κ is odd. Theorem 6. The optimal probability distribution (for the algorithm of Figure 3 ) is the bi-uniform probability distribution of parameter 0. Moreover, if the distribution is defined on [0, κ] with κ even, the probability of unfairness is Γ bi-uniform = 2 κ+2 and the average complexity in terms of number of fake rounds is Λ bi-uniform = κ 2 . Proof. First, we prove that if the probability distribution (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) is optimal, then it is biuniform. In order to prove this assertion, we give Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. Let (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) denote the probability distribution of the value k. Let γ i be the probability that the attack succeeds if it starts at round i (i > 0). We have i≥1 γ i = 2.
Proof. We have γ 1 = β 0 , γ 2 = β 0 + β 1 , γ i = β i−2 + β i−1 , . . . We have therefore
Let Γ be the probability of unfairness and Λ by the average complexity in terms of number of fake rounds; we have Γ = max i≥0 (β i + β i+1 ) = max i≥2 (γ i ) and Λ = i≥1 iβ i .
Since i≥1 γ i is constant, i≥2 iγ i is obviously minimum when the first γ i s are maximum, that is equal to Γ . Indeed, suppose that exists j ≥ 0 such that γ i = Γ if i < j and γ j < Γ,
then ∃ > 0 such that γ j = Γ − . We have so
where > j (because ≤ j contradicts Eq. 1). So j(Γ − ) + > jΓ implying that if γ i s are not maximum then i≥2 iγ i is not minimum. Since γ 0 = β 0 and ∀i ≥ 2 γ i = β i−2 + β i−1 = Γ , we have
So Λ being maximum implies that ∀i ≥ 0 β i + β i+1 = Γ which further implies that (β 0 , β 1 , . . . ) is bi-uniform. Note that if (β 0 , β 1 , . . . , β κ ) is a finite probability distribution, then γ i = β i−2 + β i−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ κ + 1, γ κ+2 = β κ and γ i = 0 if i > κ + 2.
We prove now that the bi-uniform probability distribution of parameter t is optimal when t = 0. As previously, we argue that i≥1 iβ i is minimum when the first β i s are maximum. Since ∀i ≥ 0 β i + β i+1 = Γ , the probability distribution is optimal if β i = 0 when i is odd, that is when t = 0. Since β i = 0 when i is odd, we suppose that κ is even. So, if (β 0 , β 1 , . . . , β κ ) is a bi-uniform probability distribution of parameter 0 such that κ is even, we have 
